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ARGUMENT 
I . THE UTAH STATUTORY CLERGY-PENITENT PRIVILEGE APPLIES ONLY TO 
PENITENTIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS OF WRONGDOING, 
The B r i e f of I n t e r v e n o r , The Church of J e s u s C h r i s t of 
Latter-Day Saints ("LDS Church"), goes to great lengths t o argue 
that the word "confession", as i t i s twice used in Utah Code Ann. 
S 7 8 - 2 4 - 8 ( 3 ) , does not r e a l l y mean confess ion , but that i t means 
whatever the LDS Church and other r e l i g i o u s organizat ions want i t 
t o mean. According to the LDS Church, whether or not a 
communication i s a confes s ion , i t must be considered a "confession" 
within the meaning of Sect ion 78-24-8(3) i f the LDS Church 
determines the communication i s c o n f i d e n t i a l . That i s not the law 
and has never been the law. Very simply, i f the Utah Legis la ture 
wants to expand the c l ergy-pen i tent p r i v i l e g e , i t has the power to 
do so ; the job i s not for the courts to perform. 
A
- Within the Meaning of Sect ion 7 8 - 2 4 - 8 ( 3 ) , the Pla in 
Meaning of the Term "Confession" i s a P e n i t e n t i a l 
Acknowledgement of Wrongdoing, 
The LDS Church would have t h i s Court in terpre t the word 
"confession" in Sect ion 78-24-8(3) as encompassing any 
communications deemed by a r e l i g i o u s organizat ion to be 
"confidential" — regardless of whether the communications r e l a t e 
to an acknowledgement of wrongdoing.1 Such l e x i c o l o g i c a l anarchy 
1
 See, e . g . , Brief of LDS Church at 14 (the p r i v i l e g e extends "to 
conf ident ia l communications between clergyman and communicant within the doctrine 
of the church invo lved ." ) . 
Likewise, Magistrate Boyce found that the communications at i s sue are "non-
confess ional and non-penitent ia l" , Scott v. Hammock, 133 F.R.D. 610, 612 (D. Utah 
1990), but that they are nonetheless pr iv i l eged simply because they are 
considered "confidential within the doctrines of the LDS Church." Id. at 613. 
( cont inued . . . ) 
1 
is wholly insupportable. As much as the LDS Church would like to 
avoid the fact, the term "confession" in § 78-24-8(3) does have a 
meaning in the English language. 
By blatantly misrepresenting the position of Petitioner 
Michelle Scott ("Scott"), the LDS Church sets up a huge straw man 
and commits half its brief to heroically knock it down. The birth 
of that straw man is found in the following statement: 
The language of the statute, Scott's argument goes, 
provides only that "confessions" are protected; the term 
confession "plainly" means that the communicant must be 
seeking absolution or forgiveness for wrongdoing; and 
Hammock was not seeking forgiveness when he discussed his 
conduct with Bishop Brandt. Therefore, according to 
Scott, Hammock's discussions with Bishop Brandt are not 
protected under Utah's clergy privilege. See Brief for 
Petitioner at 12-15. 
Brief of LDS Church at 14-15. 
The LDS Church does not explain how it arrived at that 
description of Scott's position, but it is dead wrong. True, Scott 
vigorously asserts that the clergy-penitent privilege statute 
provides protection only for confessions; however, Scott has never 
asserted that the communicant must be seeking absolution or 
forgiveness in order for a confession to be privileged.2 The LDS 
1(...continued) 
According to Magistrate Boyce's unique opinion, "it seems appropriate to use the 
term 'confession' to mean a confidential communication within the doctrine of the 
church involved." Id. at 619. 
2
 The LDS Church represents that "[t]his is the same argument considered 
and rejected by Magistrate Boyce . . . " Brief of LDS Church at 15. That is 
simply false. For illustrations of Scott's arguments before Magistrate Boyce, 
see n.4 infra• 
Magistrate Boyce may have confused the matter somewhat when he stated: "The 
term confession, if narrowly read, would exclude acknowledgements that were made 
in the course of solicitation of religious counseling and advice." Scott v. 
Hammock, 133 F.R.D. at 618. Scott has never urged such a narrow reading of the 
(continued...) 
2 
Church c i t e s to pages 12-15 of S c o t t ' s Brief in support of i t s 
cha rac t e r i za t ion of S c o t t ' s argument (Brief of LDS Church a t 15), 
yet the words "forgiveness" or "absolution" do not appear anywhere 
there — nor does the argument ascribed to Scott by the LDS Church 
appear anywhere in any of S c o t t ' s wr i t t en or o ra l arguments.3 
S c o t t ' s pos i t ion i s — and always has been4 — t h a t (1) a 
communication must be a "confession" to be pr iv i leged under 
S 78-24-8(3); (2) a confession i s simply a p e n i t e n t i a l admission of 
wrongdoing; and (3) since Hammock did not confess anything,5 the 
p r i v i l ege does not apply. To be "pen i t en t i a l " , a communication 
need not be made in a quest for forgiveness. Rather, a p e n i t e n t i a l 
2 ( . . • c o n t i n u e d ) 
term "confession". If an "acknowledgement" i s of wrongdoing, Scott has 
c o n s i s t e n t l y maintained i t would be a "confession". Again, see n.4 in fra . 
3
 Having e n t i r e l y diverted the course of the argument in t h i s matter t o a 
meandering path of theology and irrelevancy, the LDS Church continues t o attack 
the imaginary argument that seeking forgiveness or absolution i s a necessary 
condit ion for the invocation of the p r i v i l e g e . See, e . g . , Brief of LDS Church 
at 15, 20 n . l l , 21 n.12, 25, 28. 
4
 See, e . g . , P l a i n t i f f ' s Memorandum in Response t o Motion t o Quash Subpoena, 
Record Document No. ("R") 54, at 3 ("The narrow and pla in language of the Utah 
s t a t u t e l i m i t s the exerc i se of the pr i e s t -pen i t en t p r i v i l e g e t o communications 
by a penitent who has made a confes s ion ." ) ; id . at 6 ("Because the p r i e s t -
penitent p r i v i l e g e i s ava i lab le only i f there has been a ^confession' and because 
Hammock has conceded that there was never a N confess ion' , the p r i e s t - p e n i t e n t 
p r i v i l e g e does not of fer any protect ion against the d i sc losure . . . " ) ; 
Transcript of Proceedings Before the Honorable Ronald Boyce, October 18, 1990, 
R. 97, Ex. "H", at 16 ("There was no communication to which the p r i v i l e g e would 
attach in t h i s case , very simply because there was no confess ion being made."); 
id . at 21 ("[I ] f someone knows that they have done something wrong and they seek 
t o make penitence [ s i c penance], i f they seek t o confess that s i n t o an 
e c c l e s i a s t i c a l authority that i s when there i s the p r i v i l e g e . " ) ; Objection t o 
Magistrate 's Decis ion and Order, R. 70 at 22 ("The Utah s t a t u t e provides a 
p r i v i l e g e for confess ions — acknowledgements of wrong-doing — communicated t o 
clergymen, but, there being no record of such a communication in t h i s case , there 
i s simply no p r i v i l e g e that attaches t o any of the subject communications."). 
5
 Hammock t e s t i f i e d three times that h i s conversations with the bishop were 
not in the context of confessing anything. Hammock Deposit ion, pp. 69-71. 
Nowhere in the record i s there any indicat ion that Hammock acknowledged any 
wrongdoing during h i s communications with any e c c l e s i a s t i c a l a u t h o r i t i e s . 
Therefore, there has been no confess ion and, hence, no pr iv i l eged communication. 
3 
communication is simply an acknowledgement that one has done 
wrong.6 In considering narrowr clergy-penitent privilege statutes 
6
 The following definitions are useful for the analysis here: 
Peniten1:r a. regretting sin or offense and willing to atone; 
repentant; contrite; doing penance. 
Penitence, penitency, n., the state of being penitent; regret for 
offense committed; sorrow, accompanied with the desire to atone. 
Atone, v.i./ to make amends or reparation (for wrongdoing, a 
wrongdoer, etc.) 
Repent, v.i./ 1. to feel pain, sorrow, or regret for something one 
has done* or left undone; to be conscience-stricken or contrite.... 
3. in theology, to feel such sorrow for sin as leads to amendment of 
one's ways; to be penitent. 
Confess, v.i. 1. to admit or acknowledge one's faults or crimes; own 
up to one's guilt. 2. in ecclesiastical usage, (a) to tell one's 
sins in order to receive absolution. 
Confession, n. 1. ...the acknowledgement of anything adverse to 
one's interest or reputation.... 3. a disclosing of sins or faults 
to a priest in order to receive absolution. 
Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary Unabridged (Second Edition). 
Scott has no argument whatsoever with any of the definitions above. 
However, again caught up in its own mischaracterization of Scott's position, the 
LDS Church asks the following misleading rhetorical question: 
Other than the naked advancement of her own interest, why did Scott 
adopt the former definition [of "confession" as the disclosing of 
sins to receive absolution] as the "plain meaning" of the statute, 
instead of the latter [that "confession" means the acknowledgement 
of anything adverse to one's interest or reputation]? 
Brief of LDS Church at 15. Very simply, Scott has not "adopted" either of the 
definitions of confession; she agrees that either may be utilized. In fact, she 
proffered both definitions in her Objection to Magistrate's Decision and Order, 
R. 70, at 12-13. 
In order to resolve any conflict about the definition of "confession", 
perhaps the best source — or at least one upon which the parties can all agree -
- is the recent book, Repentance, authored by fourteen General Authorities of the 
LDS Church. (Benson, et al., Repentance, Deseret Book Company 1990). In a 
chapter entitled "The Meaning of Repentance," Elder Theodore M. Burton provides 
a useful definition, as follows: 
Confession is an admission of guilt that occurs aj3 repentance 
begins. (Emphasis in original.) 
Repentance, at 11. (See also the identical definition cited in the Brief of LDS 
Church at 6, attributed to Spencer Kimball, who previously served as President 
of the LDS Church.) 
(continued...) 
4 
like § 78-24-8(3), the courts — with one aberrational exception7 -
6(...continued) 
The American Law Institute described "penitential communication" as 
follows: 
[A] confession of culpable conduct made secretly and in confidence 
by a penitent to a priest in the course of the discipline or 
practice of the church or religious denomination or organization of 
which the penitent is a member. 
Model Code of Evidence of the American Law Institute (1942), Rule 219. With an 
expansion of its applicability beyond "priest" to all clergy, that definition is 
urged by Scott for utilization in this case. 
7
 After recklessly mischaracterizing Scott's position in this matter, see 
pp. 2-3, 4 n.6, supra, the LDS Church finds it appropriate to label as 
"outrageous" Scott's statement in her initial brief that "all [jurisdictions with 
similar statutes] have held that the privilege applies only if the communication 
was penitential in nature." Brief of LDS Church at 27-28. The LDS Church then 
continues with the following fabrication: 
This statement is wholly misleading and completely incorrect; 
indeed, several courts have interpreted statutes virtually identical 
to Utah's in a much broader fashion than Scott would like to admit. 
Brief of LDS Church at 28 (emphasis added). 
Scott concedes that her counsel's initial research did not ferret out one 
case, Kruqlikov v. Kruqlikov, 29 Misc. 2d 17, 217 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup.Ct. 1961), 
appeal dismissed, 16 A.D.2d 735, 226 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1962), a decision of one 
judge — the trial court — in New York, in which it was held that New York's 
clergy-penitent privilege statute (which is substantially identical to Utah's) 
provides a privilege for "confidential communications" because they "must be 
deemed to fall within the spirit of this statute." 217 N.Y.S.2d at 847. 
According to the LDS Church, Kruqlikov — a trial judge's unreasoned 
opinion that flies in the face of all other cases considering narrow privilege 
statutes like Utah's — is M[t]he leading case on this issue." Brief of LDS 
Church at 28. However, after reviewing the case law and the various law review 
articles discussing Kruqlikov (articles relied upon by the LDS Church), one is 
compelled to ask, "Whom has Kruqlikov led?" The fact is, no court construing a 
narrow privilege statute like Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(3) has followed Kruqlikov. 
Further, the commentators have been less than kind to Kruqlikov. See, e.g. , 
Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements Versus The Clergy 
Privilege And Free Exercise of Religion, 71 Minn.L.Rev. 723 (1987) ("Mitchell"), 
at 750 n. 156 (marital counseling at issue in Kruglikov does not seem to qualify 
for privilege because, inter alia, it is "not necessarily penitential."). 
Kuhlman, Communications to Clergy—When Are They Privileged?, 2 Val.U.L.Rev. 265, 
272 (1968) ("Kuhlman"), which is relied upon by the LDS Church, roundly 
criticizes Kruglikov, as follows: 
The court [in Kruglikov], without bothering to support its decision 
with citations of authority or any reasoning, simply held that what 
was said by the parties in the rabbi's study was stamped "with that 
seal of confidence which the parties in such a situation would feel 
no occasion to exact." 
(continued...) 
5 
- have universally held that only confessions are privileged. 
Those cases are divided, but only on the issue of whether a 
confession must be mandatory in order for it to be privileged. 
See, e.g., Kuhlman, supra, at 270-272. 
For instance, in In Re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602# 237 N.W. 589 
(1931), a case mystifyingly relied upon by the LDS Church, the 
court read the privilege statute (which was essentially identical 
to Utah's statute) as applying to voluntary and mandatory 
confessions alike.8 In that case, so warmly embraced by the LDS 
Church, the court answered the question certified to this Court, 
making it abundantly clear that a communication "must . . . be 
7(. ..continued) 
Having falsely asserted that '"several courts" have gone Kruglikov's way 
(Brief of LDS Church at 28), the LDS Church cites to only one other case, People 
v. Pecora, 107 Ill.App. 2d 283, 246 N.E.2d 865 (1969). The LDS Church represents 
that in Pecora the court construed "a statute very similar to Utah's" and 
excluded a pastor's testimony regarding communications in the course of marriage 
counseling. However, the truth is that the statute at issue in Pecora was a far 
cry from Utah's statute, protecting against disclosure of "any information which 
has been obtained by [a clergyman] in such professional character or as such 
spiritual advisor." If the statute under consideration in Pecora had been 
enacted in Utah, the question certified to this Court would never have arisen. 
8
 The privilege statute at issue in In Re Swenson provided as follows: 
A clergyman or other minister of any religion shall not, without the 
consent of the party making the confession, be allowed to disclose 
a confession made to him in his professional character, in the 
course of discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of the 
religious body to which he belongs. 
237 N.W. at 590. 
The Court read the last clause of the statute as meaning that "it is 
sufficient whether such ^discipline' enjoins the clergyman to receive the 
communication or whether it enjoins the other party . . . to deliver the 
communication." 237 N.W. at 591. The narrower approach was taken by Chief 
Justice Larson in Clawson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 162 P.2d 759, 769-70 (Utah 1945) 
(C.J. Larson, concurring) ("The clergical relation bars only information obtained 
in confessions (communications) and then only where such confessions are enjoined 
upon the confessor by course of church practice or discipline."). 
6 
penitential in character" for the privilege to apply. 237 N.W. at 
591. The court described the coverage of the statute as follows: 
[T]he "confession" contemplated by the statute has 
reference to a penitential acknowledgement to a clergyman 
of actual or supposed wrongdoing while seeking religious 
or spiritual advice, aid, ox; comfort, and that it applies 
to a voluntary "confession" as well as one made under a 
mandate of the church. 
237 N.W. at 590 (emphasis added). 
Nothing in Swenson could possibly lead one to the conclusion, 
urged by the LDS Church and as stated in Magistrate Boyce's 
opinion, that the term "confession" has such a broad meaning as to 
encompass all "confidential communication[s] within the doctrine of 
the church involved." Scott v. Hammock, 133 F.R.D. at 619. 
Rather, as stated in Swenson, and every other case (except one9) 
interpreting narrow privilege statutes similar or identical to 
§ 78-24-8(3), only penitential acknowledgements of wrongdoing are 
privileged.10 
9
 See pp. 5-6 n.7, supra. 
10
 See, Brief of Petitioner at 21-23. See also Cimijotti v. Paulsen, 219 
F.Supp. 621, 624 (N.D. Iowa 1963) (construing statute far broader than Utah's, 
held that "the statements [must] be penitential in character and made by the 
penitent"); In Re Estate of Soeder, 7 Ohio App.2d 271, 220 N.E.2d 547, 568 (1966) 
(Ohio's statute, nearly identical to Utah's, "is based on sound policy . . . 
which concedes to religious liberty a rule of evidence that a clergyman shall not 
disclose . . . the secrets of a penitent's confidential communication to him."); 
Kuhlman, supra, at 268 ("For a communication to be privileged under [the 
'traditional statute', such as Utah's . . . [t]he communication must be a 
'confession'."); Mitchell, supra, at 740 ("Colorado's [statute, virtually 
identical to Utah's] is brief and narrow and limits the privilege . . . to 
confessions."); Stoyles, The Dilemma Of The Constitutionality Of The 
Priest-Penitent Privilege — The Application Of The Religion Clauses, 29 
U.Pitt.L.Rev. 27, 35 (1967) ("[I]n the typical statute [like Utah's] . . . the 
communication must be a 'confession'", and under such statutes, "[s]tate courts 
have often found that a communication was not of a confessory nature and 
therefore was not protected by the privilege."). 
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B. The Clergy-Penitent Privilege Statute Must Be Interpreted 
According to its Terms, Not According to What Various 
Religious Organizations or the Courts Believe Should be 
Confidential. 
The Utah Legislature enacted § 78-24-8(3) by twice utilizing 
the term "confession." Citing Magistrate Boyce's opinion, the LDS 
Church argues that "the statute's [sic] 'stress on "confession" is 
at the dilution of the language "in the course of the discipline 
enjoined by the church to which he belongs."'" Brief of LDS Church 
at 18. However, the LDS Church and Magistrate Boyce would simply 
delete the term "confession" and substitute in its place the phrase 
"communication deemed by the church to be confidential." That sort 
of judicial tampering with a statute cannot be sanctioned. 
This Court has long recognized that statutory interpretation 
"must be based on the language used, and that the court has no 
power to rewrite a statute to make it conform to an intention not 
expressed." Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 107 Utah 502, 505, 155 P.2d 184, 185 (1945). As a 
corollary, this Court presumes the legislature has used the terms 
of a statute advisedly, and that courts should interpret those 
terms in accord with their usually accepted meanings. See Board of 
Educ. of Granite School Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 
1035 (Utah 1983) . 
Apparently because of a "trend" toward a broader application 
of the clergy-penitent privilege in the federal common law, Scott 
v. Hammock, 133 F.R.D. at 615-16, and because of his surmises about 
religious doctrines and what the Utah territorial legislature 
8 
intended, id. at 618, Magistrate Boyce attributed a meaning to 
"confession" far beyond that ever used in the English language. 
The federal common law is without any value in interpreting 
Utah's statute. Rule 501, Federal Rules of Evidence. Further, the 
"legislative history" of § 78-24-8(3) described in Magistrate 
Boyce's opinion — and so enthusiastically embraced by the LDS 
Church — is not legislative history at all; it is merely 
guesswork, based in part on a misunderstanding of LDS Church 
doctrine. There is no need at all to resort to legislative 
history, even if it could be ascertained. Where, as in this case, 
the statutory language is not vague or ambiguous, the courts must 
assume that the legislature meant what it said and apply the plain 
meaning of the statute instead of trying to divine "legislative 
intent."11 That principle is essential if the rule of law, rather 
than the imposition of the particular views of individual judges, 
is to prevail. The decision of Magistrate Boyce and the position 
of the LDS Church here violates that rule, supplanting the guesses 
as to the intentions of the Utah territorial legislature for the 
plain expression of the law in the statute. 
In addition to adhering to the plain meaning rule, the courts 
are to construe and apply privilege statutes strictly because they 
have the effect of "clos[ing] another window to the light of 
11
 Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989); Allisen v. 
American Legion Post #134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988); P.I.E. Emp. Federal 
Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 1151 (Utah 1988); Jensen v. Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984); Matheson v. Crockett, 577 P.2d 
948, 949 (Utah 1978). 
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truth." State v. Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325, 1327-28 (Utah 1979)-12 
Nothing contradictory to the rule of strict construction is found 
in any of the cases cited by the LDS Church. 
Section 78-24-8(3) does not refer to "counseling" or other 
types of communications broader than "confessions". To hold that 
the term "confession" means something more than "confession" is not 
simply to torture the word; it would amount to judicial alteration 
of the English language. Officials of the LDS Church once sought 
to alter completely the English alphabet, see Weller & Reid, "The 
Deseret Alphabet," True West, at 14-16 (Sept.-Oct. 1958); now its 
lawyers seek to change the meaning of common English words.13 
Section 78-24-8(3) may be "poorly drafted," Yellin, The 
History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23 
Santa Clara L.Rev. 95, 107 (1983) ("Yellin"), and "archaic", 
Kuhlman, supra, at 272, but it says what it says until the 
legislature changes it. The job of improving the statute is not 
12 S e e
 also Gold Standard v. American Barrick Res., 801 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah 
1990) (the attorney-client "privilege should be Nstrictly construed in accordance 
with its object.' " ) , quoting Jackson v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 27 Utah 2d 310, 
495 P.2d 1254, 1257 (1972); 81 Am.Jur.2d Witnesses § 141 at 183 ("[B]ecause the 
assertion of a statutory privilege is usually an inhibiting limitation upon the 
discovery of truth, such privileges are in derogation of the common law and 
should be strictly construed."). 
13
 Contrary to the position of the LDS Church here, an LDS Church stake 
president had no problem with the term "confession" in State v. Coxf 742 P.2d 
694, 696 (Or. App. 1986), where an admission by a step-father of sexual 
intercourse with his daughter was at issue. In Cox, the court reviewed the stake 
president's testimony as follows: 
He testified at a pretrial hearing that stake presidents are 
accustomed to hearing "confessions": 
"On the local level there are four individuals who 
I guess you say serve as confessors in that comparison 
to the Catholic Church. And that is the bishop and the 
three members of the stake presidency. I'm one of those 
members." 
10 
for the courts to perform. "Courts are not authorized to rewrite 
a statute because they might deem its effects susceptible of 
improvement." Badaraco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 398 
(1984).14 
I I • COMPELLED DISCLOSURE OF HAMMOCK'S NON-CONFESSIONAL COMMUNI-
CATIONS WOULD NOT VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE 
UNITED STATES OR UTAH CONSTITUTIONS, 
A. The E s t a b l i s h m e n t Clause i s Not I m p l i c a t e d Simply by 
Reason o f t h e Fact That a S t a t u t e Might A f f e c t D i f f e r e n t 
R e l i g i o u s O r g a n i z a t i o n s D i f f e r e n t l y , 
The LDS Church c l a i m s t h a t a p r i v i l e g e c o v e r i n g o n l y some 
communications c o n s i d e r e d t o be " c o n f i d e n t i a l " by c e r t a i n r e l i g i o n s 
i s v i o l a t i v e of "Establ i shment P r o v i s i o n s " of t h e Utah 
C o n s t i t u t i o n . This p e c u l i a r argument i s summed up as f o l l o w s : 
P l a i n l y , a s t a t u t e t h a t p r o t e c t s t h e c o n f i d e n t i a l 
communications of o n l y one or a few r e l i g i o n s , but not 
t h e c o n f i d e n t i a l communications of o t h e r r e l i g i o n s , t e n d s 
t o f a v o r and advance t h e former w h i l e impos ing a 
d i s a d v a n t a g e on t h e l a t t e r . 
14
 See a l so Simrin v. Simrin, 233 Cal.App.2d 90, 43 Cal.Rptr. 376 (1965) 
where, under a narrow s ta tu te s imilar to Utah's , communications with a rabbi 
during marriage counsel ing were held not to be p r i v i l e g e d . The court in Simrin 
took a pr inc ip led approach, s ta t ing as fo l lows: 
[The s t a t u t e ] i s l imited to confess ions . . . . I t would wrench the 
language of the s ta tu te t o hold that i t appl ies t o communications 
made t o a r e l i g i o u s or s p i r i t u a l advisor act ing as a marriage 
counselor . We think t h i s r e su l t regret table for reasons of public 
p o l i c y . . . , but the wording of the s ta tu te leaves us no cho ice . 
43 Cal.Rptr. at 379 (emphasis added). No l e s s principled approach should be 
taken in the appl icat ion of Utah's c lergy-peni tent p r i v i l e g e s t a t u t e in t h i s 
case . See e . g . , State v. Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah 1979) ("It i s 
ne i ther our duty nor prerogative t o pass upon the wisdom of [a p r i v i l e g e 
s t a t u t e ] . - ) ; Gord v. Sal t Lake City, 434 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1967) (A s t a t u t e 
"should not be . . . applied other than in accordance with i t s l i t e r a l wording 
unless i t i s so unclear or confused as t o be wholly beyond reason, or inoperable, 
or i t contravenes some bas ic cons t i tu t iona l right" and, " [ i ] f i t meets these 
t e s t s i t i s not the cour t ' s prerogative t o consider i t s wisdom, or i t s 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s . . . " ) . 
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Brief of LDS Church at 40.15 
There can be l i t t l e wonder why such a "plain" proposition i s 
stated without the c i ta t ion of any authority; i t i s not only not 
"plain" — i t i s contrary to law and reason. In sum, the LDS 
Church i s saying that since confession plays a role in the Catholic 
and LDS Churches, but i t has no place in some other re l ig ions , to 
allow a privi lege for confessions, without allowing a privi lege for 
a l l other communications considered by certain rel ig ions to be 
confidential , would be unconstitutional.16 To require absolute 
equality of the ef fects l eg i s la t ion may have on various rel igions 
i s a fine ideal; however, in the real world, i t i s impossible. 
Suppose the existence of a rel igious organization (the 
Marxarians) that i s doctrinally opposed to the ownership of private 
property. Would tax exemptions be unconstitutional because the 
Marxarians could not take advantage of them while other churches 
did? To reach such an absurd conclusion, the Marxarians might 
parrot the LDS argument, asserting that "plainly, a statute that 
results in tax advantages for some re l ig ions , but not for others, 
tends to favor and advance the former while imposing a disadvantage 
on the la t ter ." However, different ef fects do not pose the 
For another statement of the LDS Church's argument, see p. 14 n.19, 
in fra . 
16
 The p o s i t i o n of the LDS Church i s cer ta in ly not aided with an as ser t ion 
that the appl icat ion of the c lergy-peni tent p r i v i l e g e s t a t u t e , according t o i t s 
p la in terms, i s unconst i tut iona l . If that were the case , not only would 
Hammock's non-confessional and non-penitent ia l communications be subject t o 
compelled d i s c lo sure , but even confess ions of wrongdoing would be unprotected. 
Contrary t o the p o s i t i o n the LDS Church seems to be taking here, t o say that a 
s t a t u t e i s unconst i tut ional i s not to say that the s ta tu te can be rehab i l i t a t ed 
by expanding i t far beyond i t s terms. 
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c o n s t i t u t i o n a l problems imagined by the LDS Church. See Thomas v. 
Review Bd., Ind. Empl. Sec, D iv . , 450 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1981) ( to 
compel payment of unemployment b e n e f i t s for member of Jehovah's 
Witnesses under circumstances where others would not rece ive 
b e n e f i t s i s not u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ) ; Sherbert v . Verner, 374 U.S. 
398, 409 (1963) (requiring s t a t e s to grant unemployment b e n e f i t s t o 
a Seventh-Day Adventist who refused to work on Saturdays would not 
v i o l a t e the Establishment Clause) . 1 7 
Suppose that a r e l i g i o n (The Church of the Last Confession) 
adhered t o a "divinely inspired" doctrine requiring a l l members 
(referred to as Confess ionaires) to share with the e n t i r e 
congregation in confess ional meetings t h e i r deepest and darkest 
s e c r e t s . Suppose a l s o that the church held each Confessionaire to 
the s t r i c t e s t confidence regarding the barings of sou l s during 
confess iona l meet ings , teaching that one w i l l be damned i f he or 
she d i s c l o s e s to any outs iders what i s heard.18 F i n a l l y , suppose 
that the Utah Legis la ture f i n a l l y amended the c l e r g y - p e n i t e n t 
One commentator has noted that even i f a p r i v i l e g e s t a t u t e applied only 
t o Cathol ics , there would be no leg i t imate Establishment Clause chal lenge, 
s t a t i n g as fo l lows: 
Recognition of a tes t imonial p r i v i l e g e for only Catholic c lergy and 
p e n i t e n t s , based on a d i s t i n c t i o n between mandatory confess ion in 
the Catholic Church and the s p i r i t u a l guidance provided by the 
c lergy of other r e l i g i o n s , would, however, be supportable. Because 
the Supreme Court has held that t rea t ing d i f ferent r e l i g i o n s 
d i f f e r e n t l y does not necessar i ly offend the Establishment Clause, 
recognizing the p r i v i l e g e for the Catholic c lergy would not require 
recogni t ion for a l l c l ergy . 
Developments in the Law — Priv i leged Communications; I.V. Medical and 
Counseling P r i v i l e g e s , 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1530, 1560-61 (1985) ("Developments"). 
18
 Posing an even more extreme s i t u a t i o n i s the r e l i g i o u s doctrine of 
Islam, which prohib i t s one Moslem from t e s t i f y i n g against another. See, e . g . , 
State v. Bing, 272 S.C. 544, 253 S.E.2d 101, 102 (1979). 
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privilege statute to protect from disclosure "all communications 
made to a priest or clergyperson during the course of counseling or 
religious activities." Assuming only a few Confessionaires would 
be considered clergypersons, would the new, expanded privilege 
statute be violative of the Establishment Clause because it did not 
provide a privilege for each member of the church? Of course, the 
Church of the Last Confession would borrow the argument of the LDS 
Church here,19 contending that since all of the communications 
considered to be confidential by the LDS Church are now protected, 
all of the communications considered to be confidential by the 
Church of the Last Confession likewise must be protected. 
Therefore, following the logic of the LDS Church in this case, the 
plain terms "priest or clergyperson" in the statute must be 
disregarded and the statute must be interpreted as protecting from 
disclosure by any Confessionaire the acknowledgements of wrongdoing 
by other members. In other words, the term "clergyperson" must now 
be read as meaning "anyone", at least as applied to 
Confessionaires. That is how far the argument of the LDS Church in 
this case would require the courts to go in stretching common 
English words beyond recognition to fit its Procrustean beds of 
religious doctrine. 
The LDS Church ignores the fact that legitimate statutes, 
neutral on their face and in intent, almost certainly will affect 
19 
"Only by applying the privilege equally to the confidential 
communications of all religions can the law survive establishment 
clause scrutiny." Brief of LDS Church at 42. 
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different religions differently. In fact, it would be impossible 
to create a legal code that would place everyone or every religion 
on an equal ground, affecting each one equally. The provision of 
a testimonial privilege that applies to different religions 
differently is hardly the sort of Msponsorship, financial support 
[or] active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity" 
that was sought to be prevented by the men who wrote the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 
664, 668 (1970). 
B. The Practice of Requiring the Disclosure of 
Communications Not Protected by the Terms of a 
Privilege Statute, Regardless of Whether Such 
Communications are Considered by a Religion to be 
"Confidentialw, is Firmly Established. 
After the reformation, English law abandoned the clergy-
penitent privilege. See, e.g., Developments, supra, at 1555; 
Yellin, supra, at 101.20 Since this nation's beginning, with one 
aberrational exception (People v. Phillips, discussed below), the 
privilege has not been recognized under state law in the absence of 
a statute. See, e.g., Kuhlman, supra, at 267.21 During 1813, an 
opinion, not officially reported,22 was rendered by a New York 
Presently, there is no clergy-penitent privilege in England, even as to 
confessions made to a minister. II Halsbury's Laws of England, H 464 (4th Ed. 
1973). 
21
 The following are illustrative of cases holding that communications not 
protected from disclosure by statute must be disclosed, notwithstanding that they 
are considered "confidential" by a religious organization: In Re Williams, 269 
N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317 (1967); Keenan v. Giqante, 417 N.Y.S.2d 226, 230 
(Ct.App.N.Y. 1979) (M[W]e reject [minister's] contention that the right to 
practice his ministry bestows more extensive protection beyond the scope of the 
priest-penitent privilege accorded by statute."); Commonwealth v. L.D.B., 295 
Pa.Super. 1, 440 A.2d 1192 (1982). 
22
 Yellin, supra, at 104 n.49. 
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trial court, holding that to force a priest to testify concerning 
secret confessions would violate the free exercise of religion. 
People v. Phillips, an "editor's report" of which is abstracted in 
1 W.L.J. 109 (1843). See Yellin, supra, at 105. However, Phillips 
does not have a following; the "prevailing opinion [is] that the 
clergy privilege rests only on statute." Mitchell, supra. at 799. 
See generally Branzburq v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689-90 (1972) 
("Until now the only testimonial privilege for unofficial witnesses 
that is rooted in the Federal Constitution is the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against compelled self-incrimination.") 
The consistent history of restricting the clergy-penitent 
privilege to the confines of privilege statutes is itself a strong 
indication of the constitutionality of such a restriction. The 
United States Supreme Court, considering another Establishment 
Clause challenge, expressed the significance of the history of a 
practice as follows: 
[A]n unbroken practice of according the [tax] exemption 
to churches . . . is not something to be lightly cast 
aside. Nearly 50 years ago Mr. Justice Holmes stated: 
"If a thing has been practised for two hundred years by 
common consent, it will need a strong case for the 
Fourteenth Amendment to affect it. . . ." Jackman v. 
Rosenbaum Co. , 260 U.S. 22, 31, 67 L.Ed. 107, 112, 43 
S.Ct. 9 (1922). 
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 706-07 (1970). See also 
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Walz, 397 U.S. at 681 (J. Brennan 
concurring). 
To hold now, under either the federal or state constitutions, 
that the limitation of the privilege, according to the terms of 
16 
S 78-24-8(3)f would constitute a violation of any of the Religious 
Clauses would be an unjustified deviation from the practice and the 
law throughout this country for more than two centuries. 
III. COMPELLED DISCLOSURE OF HAMMOCK'S NON-CONFESSIONAL COMMUNICA-
TIONS WOULD NOT VIOLATE THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED 
STATES OR UTAH CONSTITUTIONS. 
Somehow, the LDS Church seeks to find somewhere in Utah's free 
exercise provisions23 a privilege against the compelled disclosure 
of whatever communications a religious organization thinks should 
be confidential. No such unrestricted license can be found — nor 
do the authorities cited by the LDS Church support such a 
constitutionally mandated privilege. 
23 The Utah Constitution contains the following Free Exercise provisions: 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right . . . to worship 
according to the dictates of their consciences; . . . (article I, 
section 1). 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. (article I, 
section 1). 
Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is guaranteed. No 
inhabitant of this State shall ever be molested in person or 
property on account of his or her mode of religious worship; but 
polygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited. (article 
III, first ordinance). 
The LDS Church has deceptively characterized the free exercise provision of 
article I, section 1 as follows: 
To review those specific and detailed [free exercise] 
provisions, Article I, Section 1 guarantees all Utah citizens Hthe 
inherent and inalienable right . . . to worship according to the 
dictates of their consciences [and] to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions." 
Brief of LDS Church at 44 (emphasis in Brief of LDS Church). In fact, the clause 
emphasized by the LDS Church is actually the "freedom of speech" clause and is 
not connected in any way to the "free exercise" clause. Inserted between those 
two clauses in article I, section 1 is the "freedom of assembly" clause, yet the 
LDS Church failed even to indicate the omission by ellipses. For good reason, 
no court has ever even remotely indicated that the constitutional freedom of 
speech entails a testimonial privilege. 
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A. The Free Exercise Provisions Do Not Create A 
Testimonial Privilege, 
The LDS Church makes some tremendous leaps in reason and 
interpretation when it asserts that the "exercise of religion" 
necessarily entails a privilege as broad as church doctrine 
desires. It goes completely off the deep end when it argues, 
without any supporting authority, that the right of free speech 
guaranteed by the Utah Constitution requires protection from 
compelled disclosure, Brief of LDS Church at 46, and that 
"
 v[p]erfect toleration of religious sentiment' can mean nothing 
less than complete confidentiality of private feelings and 
communications. " Id.24 
The argument of the LDS Church under the Free Exercise 
provisions is no longer an argument about the statutory privilege; 
Although the several provisions in the Utah Constitution are far more 
prolix than the religious clauses of the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, there is no legal or textual authority for the assertion that the 
Utah Constitution affords greater free exercise protection than the First 
Amendment. See, e.g., In Re Williams, 152 S.E.2d at 325 (state constitutional 
provision protecting "rights of conscience" is no more extensive than the freedom 
to exercise one's religion, which is protected by the First Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States."); State v. DeLaBruere, 577 A.2d 254, 270 (Vt. 
1990) (surveying several states with free exercise constitutional provisions 
substantially similar to Utah's in which "courts have either held that their 
constitutional provision offers the same level of protection to the free exercise 
of religion as the First Amendment or have decided free exercise cases involving 
their constitutional provision solely on federal precedents."). 
Further, because of the tremendous complexities involved in "the struggle 
to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses," L. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law at 815 n.89, this Court should be very wary indeed of setting 
out to chart a new course in this incredibly difficult area of constitutional 
jurisprudence. For a state supreme court to expand constitutional protections 
beyond those mandated by the United States Supreme Court is often a most salutary 
objective (especially nowadays), but this Court should follow the lead of the 
United States Supreme Court in the area of freedom of religion. For an excellent 
illustration of the complex tensions between the Establishment and Free Exercise 
Clauses, and the fine-tuning necessary to accommodate both, see Walz v. Tax 
Commission, 397 U.S. at 668-69; 674-75. To provide the greater "free exercise" 
protection sought by the LDS church would likely be to infringe on the interests 
sought to be protected by the Establishment Clause. Id. 
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rather, i t argues that a privi lege — even absent a statute — i s 
const i tut ional ly mandated. Only once, in a unique, unreported 1813 
decision of a t r i a l court, People v. Ph i l l ips , supra, has that 
argument persuaded anyone.25 Kuhlman, supra, at 267. 
If the constitutional right claimed by the LDS Church ex i s t s 
for the clergy, i t must also ex i s t for the l a i t y . The same 
rel ig ious duty not to disclose communications i s imposed on a l l the 
hypothetical Confessionaires, see pp. 13-14, supra, and Muslims, 
see State v. Bing, supra, as on LDS bishops; therefore, according 
to the LDS Church's argument, the ef fects of constitutional 
protection must be the same for a l l members of certain rel ig ions as 
for the clergy in others. If that were true, the courts would 
often be deprived of potential relevant evidence and constantly 
engaged in assessing the genuineness of asserted be l i e f s in a 
25
 Although the LDS Church maintains that "[o]ther cases and author i t i e s 
have recognized a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l free exerc i se bas i s for the c lergy p r i v i l e g e , " 
Brief of LDS Church at 46, the only case c i t e d that ac tua l ly supports that 
p o s i t i o n i s P h i l l i p s . The other cases c i t e d are far off point: 
Mullen v. United S t a t e s , 263 F.2d 275 (D.CCir . 1958), simply 
descr ibes the appl icable rule of evidence r e l a t i n g t o the p r i v i l e g e 
when a "penitent" has made a "confidential communication." Id. at 
280. 
Cimijot t i v . Paulsen, 230 F.Supp. 39 (D. Iowa 1964), a f f ' d . , 340 
F.2d 618 (8th Cir. 1965) (per curiam), did not deal with a p r i v i l e g e 
at a l l ; i t merely held that a person has a f i r s t amendment r ight t o 
f r e e l y speak with o f f i c i a l s of a church without the threat of a 
slander s u i t , and noted s p e c i f i c a l l y that " [ t ] h i s does not mean that 
in some instances [the communication] may not have t o be d i s c l o s e d . " 
Id. at 41 . 
Gri f f in v. Couqhlin, 743 F.Supp. 1006 (D.N.Y. 1990), a l so does not 
deal with a tes t imonia l p r i v i l e g e ; i t merely holds that an inmate 
has a "free exerc ise" r ight t o pr ivate ly communicate with h i s 
"sp ir i tua l advisor". 
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religious duty to keep mum. No constitution permits such a 
result.26 
Although the compelling interests of the state in "the 
rendering of a just judgment" and "the effective operation of a 
court of justice", see n.26, supra, are at stake in this case, 
there need be no showing of such an interest because Rule 45 , Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and the other rules relating to discovery 
and evidence, are neutral with respect to religion, religious 
26
 The point was well stated by the North Carolina Supreme Court as follows: 
The freedoms protected by these constitutional [free exercise] 
provisions are not limited to clergymen. Indeed, they are not 
limited to members of an organized religious body, and consequently, 
are not contingent upon proof that others share the views of the 
individual who asserts his own constitutional right to the freedom 
to exercise his religion or "right of conscience." Thus, if a 
clergyman/ not otherwise privileged to refuse to testify, is 
protected from compulsion to do so by these constitutional 
provisions, because he believes that for him to so testify would 
violate his religious duty, a layman having such belief would also 
be protected from compulsion to testify. The constitutional 
provisions extend their protection to the unorthodox, unusual and 
unreasonable belief as truly as to the belief shared by many. Thus, 
a holding that these constitutional provisions grant to the 
clergymen a privilege against compulsion to disclose upon the 
witness stand information given him in confidence because such 
disclosure would violate the clergyman's concept of religious duty, 
may well give rise to claims of a like privilege by laymen. The 
consequence might well be to deprive the courts of testimony 
necessary in order to administer justice, or to reguire them to 
embark upon the hazardous undertaking of determining the sincerity 
of the belief asserted. 
In Re Williams, 152 S.E.2d at 325 (emphasis added). In Williams, the court 
concluded that "[t]he ^compelling interest' of the state in the rendering of a 
just judgment in accordance with its law overrides the incidental infringement 
upon the religious belief of the witness that for him to testify is wrong." Id. 
at 327. Likewise, in affirming a trial court's contempt order and six month jail 
sentence for a Moslem who refused to testify against a fellow Moslem because of 
his religious beliefs, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that "the effective 
operation of a court of justice is a compelling state interest." State v. Bing, 
253 S.E.2d at 102. See generally West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943) (J. Murphy, concurring) ("The right of freedom of 
thought and of religion as guaranteed by the Constitution against State action 
includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking 
at all, except in so far as essential operations of government may require it for 
the preservation of an orderly society, — as in the case of compulsion to give 
evidence in court."). 
20 
organizations, or any other person or entity from whom evidence is 
sought.27 
IV. THE FLUID STANDARD FOR DEFINING THE TERM "CONFESSION", AS 
ADVOCATED BY THE LPS CHURCH, WOULD BE VIOLATIVE OF THE UNITED 
STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS. 
Not only does the Utah clergy-penitent privilege statute pass 
constitutional muster; the analysis advocated by the LDS Church 
would be clearly violative of both the United States and Utah 
Constitutions. 
27 
[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the 
obligation to comply with a "valid and neutral law of general 
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) 
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)." 
To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent 
upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where 
the State's interest is "compelling" — permitting him, by virtue of 
his beliefs, "to become a law unto himself," Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S., at 167, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 101 S.Ct. 1425 — 
contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense. 
Our conclusion that generally applicable religion-neutral laws that 
have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need 
not be justified by a compelling governmental interest is the only 
approach compatible with these precedents [Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229 (1976) and Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 
U.S. 131, 139 (1969)]. 
Employment Division v. Smith, 108 L.Ed.2d at 886, 890, 891 n.3, 110 S.Ct. at 
1600, 1603, 1604 n.3 (some citations omitted). 
According to the Court in Smith, which rejected the Free Exercise claims 
of two men who were denied unemployment benefits after being fired from their 
jobs for partaking of peyote pursuant to their religious doctrine, the 
requirement of a compelling state interest is properly restricted only (1) to 
laws that expressly mandate or prohibit religious beliefs or religiously based 
conduct; or (2) to "hybrid" cases alleging violations of the free exercise clause 
and another constitutional right, such as freedom of speech or of the press. 
Smith, 110 S.Ct. at 1599, 1601, 108 L.Ed.2d 884-85, 887-88. 
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A. The Doctrine-Dictated Reading of the Term 
"Confession" Proposed by the LPS Church Would Be 
Violative of Article I Section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
The LDS Church asserts that the meaning of "confession" in 
§ 78-24-8(3) must change like a chameleon, depending on the 
religious doctrine involved in each case, stating as follows: 
Section § [sic] 78-24-8(3) requires that the term 
"confession" be interpreted, not under a cramped "plain 
meaning" standard, but according to the doctrines and 
beliefs of the particular church involved. 
Brief of LDS Church at 12. 
The Utah Constitution €>xpressly proscribes that sort of 
treatment of religious belief as a criterion for determining 
whether a witness can testify. Article I, section 4 provides, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
[N]or shall any person be incompetent as a witness or 
juror on account of religious belief or the absence 
thereof. 
Clearly, the LDS Church's position that the testimonial 
privilege should apply to any communications that are considered 
"confidential" according to "the doctrines and beliefs of the 
particular church involved" is contrary to that constitutional 
prohibition.28 
28
 Article I, section 4 refers to "incompetence" of a witness. The clergy-
penitent privilege renders a clergyperson "incompetent as a witness.M See, e.g., 
Angleton v. Angleton, 370 P.2d 788, 797 (Idaho 1962) (priest "incompetent" to 
testify by reason of privilege statute); Knight v. Lee, 80 Ind. 201, 203 (1881) 
(privilege statute rendered clergyman "incompetent" to testify); State v. Kurtz, 
564 S.W.2d 856, 860 (Mo. 1978). 
22 
B. The Courts are Constitutionally Restrained From Inquiring 
About the Doctrines or Beliefs of Religions in Order to 
Determine Whether a Communication is "Confessional". 
The LDS Church seeks to have the courts inquire in every 
instance about the "doctrines and beliefs of the particular church 
involved" in order to ascertain whether, within the religion, the 
communication at issue is "confidential." Such an inquiry is 
constitutionally forbidden. 
Excessive governmental entanglement with religion is forbidden 
under the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution, 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), yet that is exactly 
what will result if the LDS Church has its way. The courts cannot 
be placed in the position of determining church doctrine or the 
importance of certain beliefs within a religion. For instance, 
Oscar W. McConkie testified that "bishops and stake presidents are 
instructed to keep strictly confidential matters brought to them in 
confidence" and that such confidentiality is "the policy of the 
church." (Depo. of Oscar W. McConkie at p. 42, 1. 1-4.) Yet he 
conceded that there have been exceptions to that confidentiality 
where state law requires the reporting of sexual abuse. Id., 
p. 40, 1. 14-25. See also Church of Jesus Christ v. Superior 
Court, 764 P.2d 759, 761 (Ariz. App. 1988) (LDS stake president 
reported sexual abuse of communicant the day after communicant was 
excommunicated). How absolute is the doctrine of confidentiality 
and what are the parameters of any exceptions thereto? The courts 
simply cannot involve themselves in mapping out the often-disputed 
and unclear terrain of such "doctrine and beliefs." 
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There e x i s t s an overr iding i n t e r e s t in keeping the 
government — whether i t be the l e g i s l a t u r e or the cour ts 
— out of the business of evaluat ing the r e l a t i v e meri ts 
of d i f fe r ing r e l ig ious claims. 
Texas Monthly, Inc . v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 16 (1989). 
The LDS Church maintains tha t the communications in t h i s case 
were "conf ident ia l" within the doctr ine of the r e l i g i o n . Scott 
d isputes t h a t , s t r e s s ing t ha t Hammock no longer wanted to be a 
member of the LDS Church a t the time of the communications, he did 
not "confess" anything, and the LDS Church permits the d i sc losure 
of communications concerning chi ld sexual abuse under c e r t a i n 
circumstances.2 9 Whatever the extent of the doc t r ina l 
c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y and exceptions t he r e to , the courts are the wrong 
forum to determine the i s sues . 
" I t i s not within the j ud i c i a l ken to question the 
c e n t r a l i t y of p a r t i c u l a r be l i e f s or p rac t i ces to a f a i t h , 
or the v a l i d i t y of p a r t i c u l a r l i t i g a n t s ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of those c reeds . " Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. a t 
, 104 L.Ed.2d 766, 109 S.Ct. 2136. Repeatedly and 
29
 Of course, the par t i e s do not expect t h i s factual i s sue t o be determined 
on appeal. However, i t i s in s t ruc t ive to consider how Magistrate Boyce came to 
h i s conclusions about LDS Church doctr ine . Magistrate Boyce s tated as fo l lows: 
There i s no question the communication in t h i s case was made t o the 
LDS Church bishop Nin the course of the d i s c i p l i n e ' of the LDS 
Church. This has been represented as being the case by the church 
counsel and no contrary evidence i s presented. 
Scott v . Hammock, 133 F.R.D. at 613. 
I t i s true that such representations were made by church counsel , but i t 
i s a l s o true that such representat ions were made without any foundation and 
without any personal knowledge by church counsel . Compare the statements made 
by church counsel during a hearing before Magistrate Boyce with h i s l a t e r 
depos i t ion testimony, se t forth in Appendix "A" hereto . That comparison lends 
support for the pr inc ip le that courts should re ly s o l e l y on the ev ident iary 
record, not on the jaw-boning of counsel . See State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 
(Utah 1990), quoting Leon Shaffer Golnick Advertis ing, Inc. v. Cedar, 423 So.2d 
1015, 1017 (Fla. D i s t . Ct. App. 1982) ("Trial judges cannot re ly upon these 
unsworn statements [of attorneys] as the bas i s for making factual determinations. 
. . . " ) . I t a l so points out some of the p i t f a l l s in c a l l i n g upon the courts to 
e s t a b l i s h what i s and i s not a matter of church doctr ine . 
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in many different contexts, we have warned that courts 
must not presume to determine the place of a particular 
belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious 
claim. 
Employment Division v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. at 1604, 108 L.Ed.2d at 891 
(citations omitted). See also Lanner v. Wimmer, 662 F.2d 1349, 
1361 (10th Cir. 1981). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Scott respectfully urges this 
Court to answer the certified question by ruling that the term 
"confession" in § 78-24-8(3) is limited to penitential 
acknowledgements of wrongdoing and that the Utah clergy-penitent 
privilege statute, as it is now written, does not extend to every 
communication designated by any religion as "confidential". 
Dated this day of September, 1991. 
ANDERSON & WATKINS 
Linda M. Jones 
Attorneys for Appellant Michelle 
Scott 
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APPENDIX A 
Proceedings Before Magistrate 
Boyce, October 18, 1990 
(R, 97, Ex, "H") 
The Court: But those 
statements from the defendant 
in this case [made to the stake 
president] were the 
underpinnings of the conclusion 
[of the ecclesiastical 
disciplinary council]? 
Mr. McConkie: That is right. 
Transcript, p. 9, 1. 16-18. 
* * * * * 
The Court: [T]ell me from the 
doctrinal standpoint of the LDS 
Church what the activity was 
that the defendant was engaging 
in in seeking the communication 
with the bishop, that is, was 
it within the legitimate 
ecclesiastical functions of the 
church?. . . [I]s there an 
ecclesiastical foundation for 
that communication? 
Mr. McConkie: Yes. 
Transcript, p. 12, 1. 8-15. 
Deposition of Oscar W. 
McConkie, February 28, 1991 
Mr. Anderson: Is it true that 
at the time of this hearing 
[before Magistrate Boyce] you 
had no knowledge as to whether 
any of the statements of Steven 
LeRoy Hammock to his bishop or 
stake president or anybody else 
in the L.D.S. Church consti-
tuted the underpinnings or 
constituted any factor in the 
conclusion reached by the 
disciplinary counsel? 
Mr. McConkie: Yes. 
McConkie Depo., p. 29, 1. 8-15. 
* * * * * 
Mr. Anderson: [W]hen you 
answered yes on line 15 of page 
12 of the transcript of the 
October 18th proceedings before 
Magistrate Boyce, is it true 
that you were referring 
generally to communications 
where there's spiritual 
counseling being sought, rather 
than specifically with regard 
to the communications by Mr. 
Hammock with his bishop? 
A. My reference was to the 
general concept of the way in 
which it operates. 
Q. [Y]ou don't know what was 
said? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Okay. He might have been 
talking to his bishop about his 
tennis game, right? 
A. I don't know what he said. 
i 
The Court: [T]he purpose of 
the communication was 
ecclesiastical rather than 
simply friendship or leadership 
in the community or something 
of the equivalent. 
Mr. McConkie: That is true. 
Transcript, p. 14, 1. 10-13. 
Mr. Anderson: On page 14, line 
ten of that transcript 
Magistrate Boyce stated that 
"the purpose of the communica-
tion ," and again he's referring 
to Mr. Hammock's communication 
with his bishop, "was ecclesi-
astical rather than simply 
friendship or leadership in the 
community or something of the 
equivalent?" And you 
responded, "That is true." 
• • * 
But the fact is, you don't know 
what the purpose of the 
communication was; isn't that 
right? 
Mr. McConkie: I say, that is 
true. 
* • * 
Q. Did you know the purpose 
that either Mr. Hammock or the 
bishop had in communicating 
with each other on any of those 
instances? 
A. I did not. 
McConkie Depo., p. 35, 1. 3-14; 
p. 38, 1. 104. 
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